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MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER AS A CASE STUDY IN 
COMPLEXITY THEORY 
STEVEN A. BANK* 
ABSTRACT 
 Major League Soccer has long been criticized for its “Byzantine” roster rules and regu-
lations, rivaled only by the Internal Revenue Code in its complexity. Is this criticism fair? 
By delving into complexity theory and the unique nature of the league, this Article argues 
that the traditional complaints may not apply in the context of the league’s roster rules. 
Effectively, critics are applying the standard used to evaluate the legal complexity found in 
rules such as statutes and regulations when the standard used to evaluate contractual 
complexity is more appropriate. Major League Soccer’s system of roster rules is the product 
of a contractual and organizational arrangement among the investor-operators. Its rules 
are complex in order to keep the investors aligned toward a common goal, while remaining 
flexible enough to pursue new opportunities and to react to changing circumstances. Alt-
hough this complexity frustrates fans and other outside observers, it may be essential to 
ensuring the continued stability and future growth of the league. 
 
I.   AN INTRODUCTION TO MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER .........................................................  391 
A.   Origins .......................................................................................................  391 
B.   Organizational Structure ..........................................................................  392 
II.   MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER’S ROSTER RULES ................................................................  394 
A.   Roster and Salary Rules ............................................................................  395 
1.   General .................................................................................................  395 
2.   Exceptions ............................................................................................  396 
(a)   International Roster Spots ...........................................................  396 
(b)   Designated Players ......................................................................  397 
(c)   Allocation Money ..........................................................................  398 
(d)  Targeted Allocation Money ...........................................................  400 
B.   Player Acquisitions—External ..................................................................  401 
1.   Allocation .............................................................................................  401 
2.   SuperDraft ...........................................................................................  403 
3.   Generation Adidas Program ................................................................  404 
4.   Homegrown ..........................................................................................  405 
5.   Discovery Process.................................................................................  408 
C.   Player Acquisitions—Internal ...................................................................  411 
1.   Trades ..................................................................................................  411 
2.   Free Agency .........................................................................................  412 
3.   Re-Entry Draft .....................................................................................  413 
4.   Waiver, Expansion, and Dispersal Drafts ...........................................  414 
5.   Emergency Replacements ....................................................................  416 
D.   Non-MLS Rules .........................................................................................  417 
III.   COMPLEXITY THEORY ..............................................................................................  419 
A.   Defining Complexity ..................................................................................  420 
B.   Rationales for Complexity .........................................................................  422 
C.   Contractual Complexity ............................................................................  425 
IV.   COMPLEXITY AS A DESIGN FEATURE IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER ............................  428 
A.   What Kind of Complexity? ........................................................................  428 
B.   The Justification for Contractual Complexity in MLS .............................  430 
1.   Partner Congruence .............................................................................  431 
                                                                                                                                       
 * Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law. This project 
benefitted from discussions with Jason Oh and Alex Stremitzer, as well as research 
assistance from Brooke Chatterton. 
386  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:385 
  
2.   Uncertainty and Changing Circumstances .........................................  433 
3.   Is MLS Excessively Complex? .............................................................  435 
V.   CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................  436 
 
 One of the most criticized aspects of Major League Soccer (“MLS”) 
is not the quality of its play or the reach of its marketing,1 but rather 
the complexity of its roster rules and regulations.2 There are Desig-
nated Players, young Designated Players, Homegrown Players, In-
ternational Players, Generation Adidas players, Senior Roster play-
ers, Supplemental Roster players, Reserve Roster players, Special 
Discovery Players, USL Priority Players and Short Term Agree-
ments, Extreme Hardship Call-Ups, Season-Ending Injury Replace-
ments, and Short-Term Injury Replacements. There is a SuperDraft, 
a Re-Entry Draft, and a Waiver Draft, as well as an Allocation Pro-
cess, a Discovery Process, Rights of First Refusal, and College Pro-
tected Players. Plus, there are trades, limited free agency, loans (both 
inter- and intra-league), and transfers (but only during the Primary 
or Secondary Transfer Windows). Clubs are subject to a version of a 
salary cap called a Salary Budget, but they can pay for player acqui-
sitions beyond that amount with General Allocation Money and Tar-
geted Allocation Money, although the amount available to teams in 
the former category is generally not specified or made transparent. 
And, of course, in a system of rules that are opaque and constantly in 
flux, plenty of players currently in the league were acquired or re-
tained through other mechanisms that are no longer in existence, 
such as Retention Funds or Weighted Lotteries,3 that appear to never 
have been formally in existence under the rules, such as Blind 
Draws,4 or that are only in existence when necessary, such as an Ex-
pansion Draft or a Dispersal Draft.5 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. MLS is still dismissed by those comparing it to the English Premier League or 
Spain’s La Liga, but at the conclusion of its 20th season, MLS has been generally praised 
for the strides it has made on the field and off the field in advancing the popularity of the 
game in America. Matt Slater, MLS at 20: How Football in the USA Is Thriving at Last, 
BBC SPORT (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/35012676?print=true. 
 2. 2017 MLS Roster Rules and Regulations, MLS SOCCER (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2017/01/01/mls-roster-rules-and-regulations-2017 
[https://perma.cc/H2LJ-RXWS].  
 3. Ben Bromley, Sorting Through the MLS Roster Rules for Player Acquisition, 
BLACKANDREDUNITED.COM (Nov. 28, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.blackandredunited.com/ 
2012/11/28/3692472/mls-roster-rules-designated-player-allocation-homegrown-discovery-
trade [https://perma.cc/L55U-UPLK]; Kyle McCarthy, Monday MLS Breakdown: Retention 
Fund Makes Perfect Sense, Raises Questions as League Builds for the Future, GOAL.COM 
(July 8, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/1110/major-league-soccer/2013/ 
07/08/4102782/monday-mls-breakdown-retention-fund-makes-perfect-sense 
[https://perma.cc/N4K3-K7VL].  
 4. Steven Goff, Jermaine Jones Joins New England Revolution. Here’s How:, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/soccer-insider/wp/2014/08/ 
25/jermaine-jones-joins-new-england-revolution-heres-how/ [http://perma.cc/85DD-LTLT]. 
But see Dan Dickinson, Gothamist Speaks with MLS Commissioner Don Garber, 




 This system has been variously described as “Byzantine,”6 
“murky,”7 and “unusual.”8 Even those versed in the minutiae com-
plain that it makes their head spin.9 One observer suggested that the 
player acquisitions rules are just further evidence of “a league that 
seems determined to compete with the Internal Revenue Service in 
terms of opacity and complexity.”10  
 Certainly MLS’ system of roster rules is complicated, but other 
U.S. sports leagues have complicated processes that include various 
forms of drafts, salary caps, and free agency as well.11 A similar arti-
cle could likely be written about most of those other leagues. What 
makes MLS unique, however, is the “oft-changing” nature of the 
                                                                                                                                       
GOTHAMIST.COM (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://gothamist.com/2014/09/04/ 
gothamist_speaks_with_mls_commissio.php [https://perma.cc/W77G-NUAF] (in an 
interview, Garber claims that “it was a little unfair to call it a blind draw,” because it was 
done over Skype with both teams). 
 5. Official MLS Expansion Draft Rules, MLS SOCCER (Oct. 16, 2010,  
2:57 PM), http://www.mlssoccer.com/news/article/official-mls-expansion-draft-rules 
[https://perma.cc/9JKY-PGQC]. The expansion draft may also be on its way out. See 
Kristian Dyer, Source: MLS Discussing Elimination of Expansion Draft, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Nov. 17, 2015, 4:40 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/soccer-fc-yahoo/mls-might-end-
expansion-draft-093724765.html [https://perma.cc/9TL9-ATQ2]. A Dispersal Draft has 
been conducted to reallocate players after a team is disbanded, which most recently 
occurred with the shuttering of Chivas USA. Jim Peltz, Seven Players from Defunct Chivas 
USA Chosen in MLS Dispersal Draft, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-mls-chivas-dispersal-draft-20141119-
story.html [https://perma.cc/XG5B-PHAA].  
 6. Kevin Baxter, Teams Work with MLS’ Complex Pay Structure, L.A. TIMES,  
(July 19, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.atlanticbb.net/news/read/category/sports/article/ 
los_angeles_times-kevin_baxter_teams_work_with_mls_complex_pay_struc-tca [https://perma.cc/ 
SEA2-KESD]; Brian Sciaretta, Targeted Allocation Money: MLS Gets More Complex, 
AMERICAN SOCCER NOW (July 11, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://americansoccernow.com/ 
articles/targeted-allocation-money-mls-gets-more-complex [https://perma.cc/7W75-DVZU].  
 7. Jason Davis, The Murky MLS Acquisition Rules, US SOCCER PLAYERS  
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.ussoccerplayers.com/2012/02/the-murky-mls-acquisition-rules.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP7J-UVPQ].  
 8. Josie Becker, MLS Player Acquisition Rules: A Primer, LAG CONFIDENTIAL (July 
29, 2014, 4:08 PM), http://www.lagconfidential.com/2014/7/29/5949921/mls-player-
acquisition-rules-a-primer [https://perma.cc/YAW3-N89R].  
 9. Zach Woosley, MLS 101: New Player Drafts, Generation Adidas, Trades, 
Waivers and Roster Exceptions, DYNAMO THEORY (Jan. 20. 2012, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.dynamotheory.com/2012/1/20/2721398/mls-101-drafts-generation-adidas-trades 
[https://perma.cc/M9K8-W4T9].  
 10. Sciaretta, supra note 6. 
 11. See, e.g., PATRICK K. THORNTON, SPORTS LAW 213 (2011); Terry Pluto, Cleveland 
Cavaliers Scribbles About Trade Exceptions, J.R. Smith and Delly, CLEVELAND PLAIN  
DEALER (July 27, 2015, 3:12 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/pluto/index.ssf/2015/07/ 
cleveland_cavaliers_scribbles_26.html#incart_river [https://perma.cc/FLV8-ZN96] (“The NBA 
salary cap rules are like the IRS code or NCAA regulations. You need several accountants 
and lawyers to figure them out and put together deals.”); Greg Price, 2015 NFL Free Agency: 
Explaining Franchise Tag, Dead Money, Salary Cap Hits and More, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 
24, 2015, 10:04 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/2015-nfl-free-agency-explaining-franchise-tag-
dead-money-salary-cap-hits-more-1825640 [https://perma.cc/9J7X-94YY?type=image]. 
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rules,12 which are “prone to being amended on the fly if the men in 
the corner offices deem it convenient.”13 And when it is deemed “con-
venient” seems to be code word for when one of the most powerful 
owners wants it changed. This leads to charges that the rules are not 
merely complex, but structurally and systematically “unfair.”14 As one 
observer noted, “certain parts of the process appear to outsiders as ‘be-
ing made up as it goes along’ to give favor to one club over others.”15  
 Is this criticism fair? Could there be an implicit or explicit method to 
the seemingly ad hoc and unprincipled manner in which MLS rules ap-
pear to be written? By delving into complexity theory and the unique 
nature of MLS, this Article argues that the traditional complaints 
about complexity may not apply in the context of MLS’ roster rules. Ef-
fectively, critics of the MLS system are applying the standards used to 
evaluate legal rules such as statutes and regulations when the stand-
ards used to evaluate contractual provisions are more appropriate.  
 There is fairly rich scholarly literature that seeks to explain the 
complexity of legal rules.16 Broadly speaking, experts in this area 
                                                                                                                                       
 12. Kevin Baxter, Galaxy Facing Decisions in Off-Season Retooling, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-galaxy-facing-
decisions-in-offseason-retooling-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/7W3S-N6F8].  
 13. Leander Schaerlaeckens, The Heavy Price MLS Pays for Not Showing How It 
Spends Its Money, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 4, 2015, 12:38 AM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/soccer-fc-yahoo/mls-still-won-t-show-you-the-money-045602708. 
html?soc_src=mediacontentstory&soc_trk=tw [https://perma.cc/QEW6-R69Y].  
 14. Hank Stebbins, Blind Draw: How Major League Soccer’s Single Entity Structure 
and Unique Rules Have Impacted Soccer in the United States, 13 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 
1, 15 (2015) (“High-level players are often assigned to teams through a number of devices 
that often seem arbitrary, unfair, and confusing.”); James Starritt, Why MLS Roster Rules 
Are Unfair, and How to Fix Them, THE BLUE TESTAMENT (July 1, 2015, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.thebluetestament.com/2015/7/1/8877215/why-mls-roster-rules-are-unfair-and-how- 
to-fix-them [https://perma.cc/2KNC-HLVH].  
 15. Kip Kesgard, Dempsey’s Return to MLS Calls MLS Player Acquisition Models into 
Question, OREGONIAN (Aug. 8, 2013, 10:17 AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/timbers/ 
2013/08/dempseys_return_to_mls_but_tran.html [https://perma.cc/6MK8-S78V]; see Doug 
McIntyre, MLS Tackles the Issue of Transparency, ESPN FC (Apr. 23, 2008), 
http://www.espnfc.com/story/528307 (“MLS has taken some well-deserved heat throughout 
its history for what many view as a make-it-up-as-you-go-along attitude towards its own 
arcane set of rules and regulations.”).  
 16. See, e.g., Jason P. Davis et al., Optimal Structure, Market Dynamism, and the 
Strategy of Simple Rules, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 413 (2009); Eric Kades, The Laws of 
Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational Complexity 
Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal 
Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995); John A. Miller, 
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of 
Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 885 (2008); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-
and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern 
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using 
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning 
for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406 (1996); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some 
Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992); R. George Wright, The Illusion of 




recognize that intentionally complex rules generally pose a tradeoff 
between fairness and efficiency. They permit authorities to more fair-
ly differentiate between certain types of actions when imposing con-
sequences, but when these rules become too complicated for partici-
pants to understand and for courts to mediate disputes regarding 
their application to specific situations, then the costs may weigh in 
favor of simplification.17  
 The complexity of contractual provisions has also received signifi-
cant attention, particularly in the area of transaction-cost econom-
ics,18 as well as in the context of cooperative ventures such as strate-
gic technology alliances.19 Unlike legal complexity, which generally 
addresses the complexity of rules imposed by the government to regu-
late the behavior of its residents, contractual complexity is focused on 
the complexity of rules that parties consensually agree to be bound 
by in order to regulate each other’s behavior. In long-term contract-
ing such as in a joint venture, complex provisions are typically de-
signed to prevent partners from free-riding or acting opportunistical-
ly, while allowing the venture to retain the flexibility to pursue 
shared objectives.20 
 Major League Soccer’s roster rules may appear to be analogous to 
government rules and regulations, but their underlying basis is con-
tractual. The league is a single-entity limited liability company with 
                                                                                                                                       
Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 715 (2000). 
 17. Kaplow, supra note 16, at 150-51. 
 18. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific 
Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987); Oliver 
E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269 (1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) 
[hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]. For examples in the legal 
literature, see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and 
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91 (2000); J. 
Harold Mulherin, Complexity in Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas 
Contractual Provisions, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 105 (1986). 
 19. See, e.g., John Hagedoorn & Geerte Hesen, Contractual Complexity and the 
Cognitive Load of R&D Alliance Contracts, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 818 (2009); Joanne 
E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction 
Cost Approach, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 387 (1997); Anupama Phene & Stephen Tallman, 
Complexity, Context and Governance in Biotechnology Alliances, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 61 
(2012); Jeffrey J. Reuer & Africa Ariño, Strategic Alliance Contracts: Dimensions and 
Determinants of Contractual Complexity, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 313 (2007); Jeffrey J. 
Reuer & Africa Ariño, Strategic Alliances as Contractual Forms, ACADEMY MGMT. PROC. 
R1 (2003); Jochen Schweitzer & Siegfried P. Gudergan, Contractual Complexity, 
Governance and Organisational Form in Alliances, 2 INT’L J. STRATEGIC BUS. ALLIANCES 
26 (2011).  
 20. Zeynep Hansen & Matthew Higgins, The Effect of Contractual Complexity on 
Technology Sourcing Agreements 4-5 (Ga. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 4979, 2007), 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4979/1/MPRA_paper_4979.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPP2-KL77].  
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investors who contract to operate the individual teams (the “investor-
operators”), rather than a separate entity organizing competition 
among independently-owned teams.21 This means that all of the in-
vestor-operators have a stake in the league and in the performance of 
all of its teams. The teams may compete on the playing field, but the 
investor-operators share in both the profits and the expenses of all of 
the other teams.22 Although the investor-operators have grown more 
independent over the years, they remain tied together by this basic 
organizational feature.  
 Given the single-entity nature of the league, it makes little sense 
to evaluate the roster rules as legal rules. Not only have the league’s 
investor-operators consented to these rules by virtue of both the lim-
ited liability company agreement and their individual operator 
agreements, but they each have a seat on the governing board of the 
league. In this sense, MLS’ system of roster rules is the product of a 
contractual and organizational arrangement among the investor-
operators. As such, they are not complex to ensure fairness among 
the teams; rather, they are complex because of the need to keep in-
vestor-operators aligned and to enable MLS to remain flexible in the 
face of global competition and opportunities. While this frustrates 
fans and other outside observers, it may be essential to ensuring the 
continued stability and future growth of the league. 
 This Article explains why the complexity of the MLS roster rules 
is a design feature rather than a flaw. Part I sets the background by 
describing the origins and legal structure of MLS. In Part II, the Ar-
ticle details MLS’ roster rules and regulations and the aspects that 
appear to make it complex, highlighting the complaints about the 
technical detail, opacity, and apparent favoritism of the constantly 
changing system. To start to better understand whether the criticism 
of MLS’ complexity is accurate and justified, Part III discusses what 
we might mean when we identify something as “complex,” whether in 
the context of legal rules or contractual provisions, and the rationales 
that are offered in each case. This sets the stage for Part IV, where 
                                                                                                                                       
 21. Joseph Lennarz, Growing Pains: Why Major League Soccer’s Steady Rise Will 
Bring Structural Changes in 2015, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 142 (2014). 
 22. This distinguishes it from revenue sharing in other U.S. professional sports. 
Under those arrangements, teams may split the television money, gate receipts, and 
merchandising income, but rival owners do not share the risk that one of their opponents 
may not be able to make payroll. Compare Kevin Baxter, MLS Goes from Near Extinction 
to Remarkable Success, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
sports/soccer/la-sp-soccer-baxter-20151206-story.html [https://perma.cc/K2JA-NXHW] 
(describing how a number of owners had to “bankroll multiple teams” for the league to 
survive a financial crisis in 2001), with Howard Bloom, NFL Revenue-Sharing Model Good 
for Business, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 5. 2014, 1:25 PM), http://www.sportingnews.com/ 
nfl/story/2014-09-05/nfl-revenue-sharing-television-contracts-2014-season-business-model-
nba-nhl-mlb-comparison-salary-cap [https://perma.cc/9TAB-ML9V] (describing the method 
of sharing revenues used by the National Football League). 




the Article explains why the efficiency/fairness tradeoff use to evalu-
ate legal complexity is not applicable in the context of MLS’ player 
acquisition system. This Part offers an alternative justification for 
complexity grounded in MLS’ hybrid single-entity structure and the 
youthful league’s place in a highly competitive global marketplace. 
Given the need to keep MLS’ investor-operators aligned as the league 
pursues opportunities to improve its quality and broaden its reach, 
the Article concludes that the current state of complexity is likely to 
remain important for the foreseeable future. 
I.   AN INTRODUCTION TO MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 
A.   Origins  
 Major League Soccer was formed in 1995 and launched play in 
1996. It formally traces its origins to a promise the United States 
Soccer Federation (“U.S. Soccer”) made to FIFA in 1988 to form a 
first division professional soccer league if it was successful in its bid 
to host the World Cup in 1994.23 The real roots of MLS, however, 
were shaped by developments occurring several decades earlier.  
 America’s first attempt to create a top professional soccer league 
occurred in 1967. At that time, the forerunner of the original North 
American Soccer League (“NASL”) embarked on an ambitious effort 
to establish pro soccer in this country.24 Luring top stars like Pele, 
Franz Beckenbauer, George Best, and Johan Cruyff, the League 
sought to spend its way to prominence. For a stretch of years in the 
mid- to late-1970s, this succeeded with national television audiences 
and packed stadiums in many cities. In 1977, for example, the New 
York Cosmos drew crowds of 77,691 and 73,669 in home playoff 
games leading up to a Soccer Bowl matchup with the Seattle Sound-
ers, which itself had drawn crowds of 42,091 and 56,256 in playoff 
                                                                                                                                       
 23. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C. (Fraser II), 284 F.3d 47, 52-53 (1st Cir. 
2002); Lennarz, supra note 21, at 141; Diana C. Taylor, Comment, Aimed at the Goal?: The 
Sustainability of Major League Soccer’s Structure, 9 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2011). 
The original agreement with FIFA had stipulated that a first division league must 
commence before the World Cup was held, but U.S. Soccer renegotiated the deal on the 
grounds that the World Cup’s ability to raise the profile of the game in America must occur 
before a new league could be successful. Fernando Delgado, Major League Soccer: The 
Return of the Foreign Sport, 21 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 285, 295 n.1 (1997). 
 24. The North American Soccer League actually started in 1968 as the product of a 
merger between the FIFA-sanctioned United Soccer Association and the unsanctioned 
National Professional Soccer League. NASL 1968-1984: A Review of the Golden Era, 
NASL, http://www.nasl.com/a-review-of-the-golden-era [https://perma.cc/N9BV-LHDK]; 
Steve Davis, A Little History to Consider Re MLS and the Wonderful Old NASL, NBC 
SPORTS (Nov. 2, 2012, 3:35 PM), http://soccer.nbcsports.com/2012/11/02/a-little-history-to-
consider-re-mls-and-the-wonderful-old-nasl/ [https://perma.cc/6JKW-JJT9].  
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games on its home turf.25 Ultimately, however, the free spending 
ways led to the League’s demise. Paying extravagant salaries to a 
few aging stars did attract attention, but at the same time, it drove 
up salaries for all of the League’s players and attendance in many 
cities lagged behind that of the super clubs.26 Ultimately, the busi-
ness model became unsustainable. By the end of the 1984 season, the 
League folded.27  
 The spiraling costs and subsequent demise of NASL had a profound 
influence on the people responsible for creating the structure for Major 
League Soccer.28 Alan Rothenberg, the President of U.S. Soccer during 
the creation of the new league, had been a part-owner of the NASL’s 
Los Angeles Aztecs and was, therefore, intimately familiar with the 
failings of the prior attempt at first division soccer in this country.29 
This led him to search for a new organizational structure that would 
avoid the profligate spending that had characterized NASL. 
B.   Organizational Structure 
 In creating MLS, Rothenberg and the other founders knew that 
they needed a centralized structure to control costs in a way that 
would avoid antitrust challenges.30 They chose to use a single-entity 
limited liability company. As originally conceived, the limited liability 
company under this form of organization would enter into all player 
contracts, broadcasting deals, marketing deals, and even stadium 
deals as an entity. The teams would be mere divisions of the organiza-
tion itself and the “owners” of those teams would merely be investors 
who receive membership interests in the limited liability company.  
 Even before the league rolled out, the original plan had to be 
tweaked to attract a sufficient number of investors.31 Thus, rather 
than relying on a wholly passive investment entity structure, the 
league entered into contracts with the investors to operate individual 
teams.32 Subject to league-wide rules, these “investor-operators” had 
                                                                                                                                       
 25. TED PHILIPAKOS, ON LEVEL TERMS: 10 LEGAL BATTLES THAT TESTED AND SHAPED 
SOCCER IN THE MODERN ERA 46 (2015). 
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the right to hire their own front offices and coaches, select where 
their games would be played, set ticket prices, and enter into and re-
tain the proceeds of local promotional deals. The central office signed 
players to the league and allocated them to individual teams, with 
some input from the investor-operators, and the league paid player 
salaries from the revenues it received from all merchandising and 
national broadcast contracts, as well as half of the local ticket, con-
cessions, and broadcasting revenues received by each investor-
operator and remitted to the league.33  
 In the league’s early years, this modification to the single-entity 
structure did not do much to change the centralized nature of the 
league. Seven of the ten teams were run by investor-operators, but 
the league itself operated the three remaining teams.34 By 1998, 
three owners (Robert Kraft, Lamar Hunt, and Phillip Anschutz) op-
erated a majority of all of the league’s teams.35 A few years later in 
2002, with the league in financial trouble after the demise of the two 
Florida-based teams—the Miami Fusion and the Tampa Bay Muti-
ny—Anschutz came to the rescue, owning/operating half of the 
league’s ten teams, with Kraft and Hunt owning three of the remain-
ing five teams.36 If the teams and their operations were not complete-
ly controlled by MLS, as originally conceived by Rothenberg, they 
were largely so because of the concentration of control of those teams 
in the hands of the few majority investors in the league. 
 All of this played out against the backdrop of an antitrust chal-
lenge to the league’s system of allocating players and setting their 
salaries. In 1997, several players filed suit against the league, claim-
ing that it conspired with its investor-operators to violate the Sher-
man Antitrust Act by agreeing not to compete for player services.37 
Ultimately, the First Circuit rejected these claims in Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer.38 Although the league had raised its single-entity sta-
tus to defend against the claim, the court ultimately found that it did 
not need to reach that question because it concluded that the players 
had not proven that the league was able to exercise the market power 
necessary to sustain the claim.39  
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 What is perhaps most notable about the First Circuit’s opinion in 
Fraser is that it cast doubt on whether MLS was actually operating 
as a single-entity for purposes of the antitrust defense. The court 
suggested that MLS and its investor-operators comprised “a hybrid 
arrangement, somewhere between a single company (with or without 
wholly owned subsidiaries),” which the Supreme Court had previous-
ly acknowledged as not implicating Section 1 of the Sherman Act,40 
and “a cooperative arrangement between existing competitors,” 
which might still be subject to antitrust scrutiny.41  
 The weakening of the single entity structure observed by the court 
in Fraser continued in its aftermath. The number of investor-
operators diversified and the value of the non-MLS controlled reve-
nues grew from sources such as soccer-specific stadiums and local 
broadcasting deals. Arguably, the cumulative effect of these changes 
has been to eviscerate the single-entity defense to a potential anti-
trust challenge.42 Nevertheless, the one “key feature of Rothenberg’s 
original design” that remains in place is the league’s control over the 
player acquisition and transfer process.43 
II.   MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER’S ROSTER RULES 
 One might think that such a centralized scheme would make the 
transfer rules quite simple. The reality, however, has been quite the 
opposite. Describing Major League Soccer’s rules is complicated both 
because the rules are subject to numerous exceptions and special 
conditions and because they are not always spelled out clearly in any 
publicly available text, or they change frequently, leaving observers 
to learn of them only in the context of specific transactions. Indeed, 
the “MLS Roster Rules and Regulations” document provided on the 
MLS website is merely a summary description of the rules made 
available for public consumption. It is not a document containing the 
“official” rules, in a technical sense, or at least the exact language of 
those rules, which one source has described as “tucked away in 
MLS’s office and . . . not publicly available.”44 Nevertheless, even de-
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scribing the basic contours of the rules and their evolution illustrates 
the complexity of the entire system. 
A.   Roster and Salary Rules 
1.   General  
 An MLS team roster consists of a maximum of twenty-eight play-
ers and is broken up into two parts.45 The top twenty players on an 
MLS team’s roster comprise the “Senior Roster.” The salaries for 
those Senior Roster players count against the “Salary Budget” set 
and funded by the league, which effectively operates as the base of a 
salary cap that is augmented for individual teams under a variety of 
circumstances discussed below. In 2017, the Salary Budget for these 
twenty Senior Roster players stood at $3.845 million, although teams 
may leave roster spots nineteen and twenty unfilled in order to 
stretch their budget a bit farther on a per player basis. Even with 
that allowance, however, the maximum salary a player can be paid 
under the Salary Budget was $480,625 in 2017. The salaries of play-
ers occupying spots twenty-one through twenty-four (the “Supple-
mental Roster” players) and spots twenty-five through thirty (the 
“Reserve Roster” players) are not counted against a team’s Salary 
Budget.46 Nevertheless, teams are not free to pay those players what-
ever they please. In 2017, the minimum annual salary for players 
occupying spots twenty-one through twenty-four was $65,000 and the 
minimum for players occupying spots twenty-five through thirty was 
$53,000.47 Moreover, any player occupying one of the last four roster 
spots must be under the age of twenty-five as of the start of the cal-
endar year in which that season commences.  
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2.   Exceptions 
(a)   International Roster Spots 
 In addition to the numerical and salary restrictions on eligibility 
for an MLS roster, there are also restrictions based on citizenship or 
visa status. At each team’s inception, it is allocated eight “Interna-
tional Roster Spots.”48 For American-based teams, these are reserved 
for players who do not at least have a U.S. Green Card or who have 
not yet become naturalized citizens.49 The International Roster Spots 
are tradable, though, so that at any one time a team may have a limit 
of more or less than eight such spots.50 Such trades are often time-
limited, which means that the acquiring team may obtain another 
team’s International Roster Spot for the time of a particular player’s 
contract or less, after which the spot reverts to the original team.51  
 Although the concept of limiting sports for foreign players to bol-
ster the development of domestic talent is not uncommon—it most 
notably exists in the English Premier League, in part because of im-
migration restrictions, and the English Football Association has pro-
posed to further restrict foreign access52—it still manages to generate 
controversy in MLS. One reason is geography. The fact that MLS op-
erates in both the U.S. and Canada makes it more difficult to define 
an International Roster Spot than it is in a league that operates 
wholly within a single nation’s borders. For example, with the three 
teams based in Canada—Toronto FC, Montreal Impact, and Vancou-
ver Whitecaps—both U.S. and Canada players count as domestic 
players, while on the U.S.-based teams only U.S. players count as 
domestic players. Canadian teams, however, must have at least three 
Canadian domestic players on their rosters. In 2014, Don Garber, the 
MLS commissioner, indicated that a possible change to the rules was 
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under study,53 including a potential shift to a minutes played regime 
rather than a roster spot regime. Part of the concern expressed by the 
Canadian Soccer Association was that the then-current rules, by not 
counting Canadian players as domestic players on U.S.-based MLS 
teams, were artificially holding back their development, even though 
those players had an advantaged position with the Canada-based 
MLS teams.54 Ultimately, MLS adopted a rule classifying Canadian 
players as domestic, but only if they qualify as a Homegrown player, 
become a member of an MLS youth academy or a Canadian Approved 
Youth Club before the year in which they turn 16, and sign their first 
contract with an MLS team or an MLS team’s USL affiliate club.55  
 A second source of controversy has been over the historic lack of 
transparency regarding who actually occupies these International 
Roster Spots for each team and how many such spots remain availa-
ble. Historically, teams have not announced when a player received 
his Green Card or otherwise moved from domestic to international 
status. Although fans tried to track this information on a dedicated 
Wikipedia page,56 it was far from official. Only recently did MLS start 
to reveal this information on its official webpage.57  
(b)   Designated Players 
 The most prominent exception to the basic salary rules is that 
each team is permitted to sign up to three “Designated Players” or 
“DPs.” The concept originated when the LA Galaxy pursued an op-
portunity to sign former Manchester United star David Beckham in 
2006, a player who could not possibly be secured for an amount that 
would fit within the Salary Budget.58 Previously, the league had paid 
for a few above-maximum roster players—such as Landon Donovan, 
Freddy Adu, Carlos Ruiz, and Eddie Johnson—out of central funds.59 
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Under the “Beckham Rule,” as it was known, teams could formally 
pursue such high-priced players, but the investor-operators were on 
the hook individually for the excess amount.60 Although critics 
charged that the Beckham rule and the grandfathering of the former 
over-budget players from the one DP rule—most notably Landon Do-
novan—was another example of Galaxy favoritism,61 every team in 
the league had at least one DP on its roster as of the start of the 2015 
season, and there were forty-seven in total in the league, up from fif-
teen five years earlier.62 
 Since 2006, the number of permitted Designated Players has ex-
panded from one to three. For players over the age of twenty-three, 
the player carries the maximum salary budget charge of $436,250 if 
he starts the year with the team, while bearing half that much if he 
arrives in the summer, with the investor-operator picking up the tab 
for the rest of his salary. More recently, MLS created a “young” Des-
ignated Player category. If the player is twenty-one to twenty-three 
years old, however, his budget charge is $200,000, and if he is twenty 
years old or younger, his budget charge drops to $150,000. While 
teams may have a maximum of three Designated Players, for players 
age twenty-three and older, they must purchase the third spot for an 
annual fee of $150,000 that effectively operates as a tax because it is 
distributed to all the teams that do not have three Designated Play-
ers. Moreover, unlike International Roster Spots, Designated Player 
spots are not tradable, although this was not always the case. Origi-
nally, a team could trade for a second DP slot, which the New York 
Red Bulls did when it acquired a DP slot from Chivas USA almost 
three weeks after the new rule was announced.63  
(c)   Allocation Money 
 In addition to the Designated Player rule, there are a variety of 
mechanisms available to augment a team’s player salaries beyond 
the Salary Budget Charge and to increase an individual player’s 
compensation beyond the maximum salary. First, teams can “buy 
down” their budget charge through the use of what is called “Alloca-
tion Money.” Allocation Money is budget space allotted to a team that 
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can be used to make up the difference between the team’s actual Sal-
ary Budget Charge and the maximum permitted Salary Budget 
Charge. A team can buy down the budget charge of Designated  
Player as well with allocation money, but only to an amount not less  
than $150,000.64 
 There are a number of circumstances in which teams are provided 
Allocation Money. First, regardless of a team’s performance the prior 
year, every team receives an annual allotment of Allocation Money. 
In 2017, this amounted to $200,000 per team.65 Second, teams receive 
Allocation Money in certain circumstances based upon their perfor-
mance the prior year. These include both the failure to perform by 
not qualifying for the MLS playoffs and performing well by qualifying 
for the CONCACAF Champions League, which potentially involves 
carrying a larger and deeper roster to be able to play in the separate 
qualifying and elimination rounds involved with that tournament.  
 There are also circumstances in which a team can garner addi-
tional Allocation Money without meeting any performance criteria. 
The most common example is when a team transfers a player to a 
non-MLS team for a transfer fee, as opposed to letting them leave at 
the expiration of their contract on a free transfer. Although MLS 
never specifies the precise amount of allocation money that is made 
available, the maximum amount is reportedly $650,000 under what 
operates as a two-thirds/one-third split between the selling team and 
the league for most players.66 The one exception to this allocation is 
that if a club transfers a Designated Player to a club in another 
league, the club is entitled to receive an amount sufficient to recoup 
its investment in the Designated Player before any amount is shared 
with the league.67  
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 Finally, teams receive Allocation Money for a reason other than 
meeting performance criteria when an expansion team enters the 
league. In that circumstance, the expansion team gets Allocation Mon-
ey to help it stock its roster, and all of the teams get an equal amount 
of Allocation Money that presumably operates as a mechanism to dis-
tribute at least a portion of the expansion fee throughout the league. 
Additionally, any team that loses a player in the expansion draft re-
ceives additional Allocation Money to help replace that player. 
(d)  Targeted Allocation Money  
 Finally, a special form of Allocation Money is called “Targeted Al-
location Money” or “TAM.” This refers to amounts allocated to teams 
to enable them to do certain specified things: (1) sign or re-sign a 
player whose salary exceeds the maximum Salary Budget Charge; (2) 
buy down the budget charge of an existing Designated Player to a 
level that would make him no longer a Designated Player, but only if 
the team then signs a new Designated Player to an amount equal to 
or greater than the player he replaced as a Designated Player; or (3) 
sign a Homegrown player to his first professional contract, but TAM 
can only be used for up to $200,000 of that salary. Called a “dash of 
chaos” when introduced on July 8, 2015,68 the league at the time pro-
vided $100,000 per year in TAM for a period of five years, but it al-
lowed teams to use all $500,000 in one transaction.  
 Although changes to the Designated Player program were ru-
mored long before the summer of 2015,69 the popular perception is 
that the whole concept was invented to enable the LA Galaxy, which 
already had three Designated Players—Robbie Keane, Steven Ger-
rard, and Omar Gonzalez—to sign Mexican national team star Gio-
vani Dos Santos to a Designated Player contract.70 The Galaxy used 
TAM to buy down Gonzalez’s DP status and Salary Budget Charge, 
which allowed them to sign Dos Santos.71  
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 Targeted Allocation Money is a “use it or lose it” type of Allocation 
Money, since teams had to either use the $100,000 in the year of 
grant or the year following, or trade it to another team. Coupled with 
the requirement that a team may use it only to acquire or re-sign a 
DP player, this put the onus on teams to take advantage of the op-
portunity rather than merely defraying their own expenses. 
 At the end of the 2015 season, MLS announced that it was provid-
ing an additional grant of $800,000 in TAM for each of the next two 
years, but it limited this grant to be used on signings of players mak-
ing between the maximum Salary Budget Charge and $1 million.72 
Although TAM cannot be used in combination with general Alloca-
tion Money, it can be used to buy down a player’s Salary Budget 
Charge to as low as $150,000, which effectively operates to free up 
general Allocation Money for non-DP signings.73 An additional 
$400,000 was added after the 2016 season, bringing the total amount 
of TAM provided to each team to $1.2 million.74 
B.   Player Acquisitions—External 
1.   Allocation  
 Major League Soccer’s teams were originally populated in part 
through an allocation process. Before the inaugural 1996 season, the 
league allocated four “marquee” players to each of the ten teams in 
the league.75 Subsequently, teams filled out their rosters through a 
draft in which they each select sixteen players from a group of play-
ers identified by the league.76 
 Although the allocation process is no longer quite so centrally con-
trolled by the league, it does still exist to ensure a fair allocation of 
marquee players. Currently, the league identifies “marquee” players 
to include: (1) certain U.S. Men’s National Team players, (2) elite 
youth U.S. National Team players, and (3) former MLS players who 
return to MLS after joining a non-MLS team for a transfer fee great-
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er than $500,000.77 Teams are ranked each year in reverse order of 
their finish in the league. They may trade their Allocation Ranking 
with another team, but the order resets at the end of the season. 
When one of the players on the list becomes available at a price 
agreed to by the player and the league, each team in order of their 
Allocation Ranking is given an opportunity to claim the player at 
that price. If a team claims the player, then their Allocation Ranking 
drops to the end of the list. 
 One of the principal complaints about this system in the past was 
trying to identify which players were subject to the allocation draft 
and which players could be signed outside of that process. As with 
other rules, not only did the lack of transparency frustrate observers 
and players seeking to choose their own team, but it also appeared to 
disguise favoritism in player allocations.78 For example, U.S. Men’s 
National Team veteran Clint Dempsey apparently was able to avoid 
the allocation process when he moved from Tottenham back to MLS 
to play for the Seattle Sounders.79 The original explanation was that 
Dempsey was a Designated Player signing and therefore not subject 
to selection according to the Allocation Ranking,80 but this was prov-
en false almost immediately when another U.S. Men’s National Team 
player, Maurice Edu, was forced to go to the Philadelphia Union un-
der the Allocation Ranking despite also commanding a Designated 
Player contract.81 Although the language in the rules was subse-
quently altered to make clear that the allocation process didn’t apply 
to “Designated Players of a certain threshold,” the “threshold” was 
undefined, and the mechanism for selecting between competing 
teams—both willing to offer the requested amount—lead to contro-
versies over the Designated Player signings of both Jermaine Jones 
by New England and Jozy Altidore by Toronto FC.82 In the case of 
Jones, the infamous “Blind Draw” between New England and Chica-
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go to decide who would be allocated his rights subjected the league to 
particular ridicule.83 To at least partially combat those complaints, 
MLS started publishing a list of prospective players subject to the 
allocation process each year,84 which removed doubt about who was 
subject to the process regardless of salary.  
2.   SuperDraft 
 The “SuperDraft,” appears to be so-named in order to distinguish 
it from the bevy of other drafts that MLS uses to allocate or reallo-
cate players. Although it traces its roots back to the draft originally 
designed to stock teams with players beyond the first four allocated 
marquee players, the SuperDraft currently is limited to selecting 
players from college, plus a few non-collegiate international players,85 
some of whom have in the past been the product of one or more re-
gional Caribbean combines held before the combine for college play-
ers and then are invited to join the collegiate combine.86 As in other 
American sports leagues, teams that do not qualify for the prior 
year’s playoffs select in reverse order of their point finish, with the 
remaining slots filled according to the round in which the team was 
eliminated in the playoffs and then the season point total of the 
teams within each of those rounds.  
 With the decline of college soccer as a viable means of develop-
ment, commentators have routinely mentioned the declining rele-
vance of the SuperDraft.87 Others have advocated abolishing it alto-
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gether, in part because of its diminishing importance, and in part, 
because it is being supplanted by youth academies operated by the 
teams directly.88 One reason it persists is that American sports con-
sumers remain attracted to the annual spectacle of a college draft.89 
More importantly, perhaps, is that as long as at least some inexpen-
sive talent emerges through the college system, MLS appears to want 
to allocate that talent through some mechanism other than open 
market bidding.90 That does not mean, however, that the SuperDraft 
is entirely free from such influences. The Generation Adidas program 
is one example. 
3.   Generation Adidas Program 
 Starting in 1997 with the so-called Nike Project 40 and continuing 
with the Generation Adidas program, certain players are signed by 
the league prior to the SuperDraft as a means of inducing them to 
play with MLS rather than to stay in college or look overseas.91 They 
receive guaranteed contracts and education stipends, as well as sala-
ries that often pay them more than they would receive as an entry-
level draftee.92 To be eligible for the Generation Adidas program, a 
player must be an underclassman in college or a youth national team 
player.93 One attraction to a team in selecting a Generation Adidas 
player is that they are automatically considered Supplemental Roster 
players, and therefore, are not counted against the Salary Budget, 
regardless of where their salary would actually place them in the 
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rankings of player salaries on the team.94 A player then “graduates” 
from the Generation Adidas program after reaching certain unspeci-
fied performance targets that appear to include appearances, 
minutes played, and goals scored.95  
 Although MLS continues to identify and sign players through the 
Generation Adidas program, the effectiveness in identifying talent is 
questionable. In one study, the authors found that the differences be-
tween Nike Project 40/Generation Adidas players and other players was 
negligible, with the only statistically significant advantages in age, as-
sists, and ejections.96 Putting aside sample size issues with that particu-
lar study, these results may help explain the decline in the number of 
players signed to the Generation Adidas program and the rise of alter-
native paths that bypass college and the SuperDraft altogether.97  
 The case of Jeremy Ebobisse is illustrative of both the declining 
influence of Generation Adidas and the league’s willingness to be 
flexible in its rules. Ebobisse was a Duke University striker signed to 
a contract with MLS. The problem was that he signed a sponsorship 
agreement with Nike before signing with MLS, which made him inel-
igible for Generation Adidas under the terms of the league’s sponsor-
ship agreement with Adidas.98 Rather than risk losing him, though, 
or making him less attractive in the SuperDraft than other compara-
ble players, the league was reportedly considering creating a special 
roster class that mimicked the Generation Adidas benefits.99 
4.   Homegrown  
 To the extent that the college route to MLS is on the wane, it is 
the Youth Academy route that is taking its place. Under this system, 
players may be exclusively signed as “Homegrown” players by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 94. Id. 
 95. Earl Reed, MLS ’13: Is Generation Adidas Working? WORLD SOCCER TALK  
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://worldsoccertalk.com/2013/02/22/mls-13-is-generation-adidas-working/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y2A7-FYYK].  
 96. LeCrom et al., supra note 7, at 38. 
 97. For the decline in the influence of the SuperDraft, see supra note 82 and 
accompanying text. For the decline in the number of Generation Adidas players, see Ben 
Roth, A Look at the 2016 Generation Adidas Signings, COLLEGE SOCCER NEWS (Jan. 10, 
2016, 6:51 PM), http://collegesoccernews.com/index.php/articles/897-a-look-at-the-generation- 
adidas-signings-by-ben-roth [https://perma.cc/E34E-J6PX].  
 98. Steven Goff, Duke’s Jeremy Ebobisse Signs with MLS, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soccer-insider/wp/2016/08/15/dukes-jeremy-ebobisse-
signs-with-mls/?utm_term=.990b924b6897#comments [https://perma.cc/ETH7-ZR6H].  
 99. Ives Galarcep, MLS Talking Points: The Market for Landon Donovan, the  
Next Crop of Homegrown Players and More, GOAL (Dec. 30, 2016, 2:49 AM), 
http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/1110/major-league-soccer/2016/12/30/30983822/mls-talking- 
points-the-market-for-landon-donovan-the-next [https://perma.cc/K9FS-8AAB].  
406  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:385 
  
team that developed them.100 This means that they would not be sub-
ject to any further process of allocation among the other MLS teams. 
There is no limit to the number of Homegrown players a team may 
sign to its roster.101 The only eligibility criteria specified in the rules 
are that “the player [must have] been a member of a club’s youth 
academy for at least one year and . . . met the necessary training and 
retention requirements.”102 This rule has often been flexibly applied 
in order to sign an individual prospect, though, leading to charges of 
favoritism. For example, the Los Angeles Galaxy signed Jose Villar-
real to a Homegrown contract before he had finished a year with the 
club’s academy, and MLS simply required that he complete that year 
of development after signing the contract, without opening up Villar-
real to other clubs.103  
 Some have reported that there are specific numerical requirements 
for Homegrown eligibility, such as a combination of eighty practice and 
game sessions before the player leaves for college.104 To retain this 
Homegrown player status, they have to be registered as a Homegrown 
player before they enter college or are selected as a member of a U17 
or older U.S. Youth National Team, although they can maintain that 
status if registered before college (and they participate in a minimum 
of thirty practice or game sessions while in college) or before their se-
lection to a national team.105 This standard, however, has been called 
“murky,” with youth academies supposed to record “training units” 
prospects log with their academy to settle disputes about whether a 
team should be granted exclusive rights to a player as Homegrown or 
whether the player should be forced to go through the draft and be 
available to all teams.106 When confronted with disparities between the 
stated rules and the realities of certain players granted Homegrown 
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status, teams admit that certain exceptions are granted, although no 
one identifies the parameters of those exceptions.107 
 In a twist on the rule that further stretches the concept, teams can 
develop a player anywhere in the country where they set up a youth 
academy or establish an affiliate relationship with a local club. For 
example, the Galaxy’s claim to Villarreal was partially a result of 
their affiliate relationship with his former club.108 MLS, however, re-
jected a similar claim by NYCFC to Jack Harrison, a Wake Forest 
player who had been at a Manhattan youth soccer club for three 
years before NYCFC commenced existence and subsequently estab-
lished an affiliate relationship with that club.109  
 To avoid a free-for-all battle between the teams over youth play-
ers, MLS limits the players to whom a team may claim Homegrown 
status. To have exclusive rights to a player, the youth academy has to 
be part of the team’s home territory and the player has to play in 
that territory for a year, rather than simply fly in for a few trainings 
from across the country.110 The territories are often quite large 
though. For example, while most clubs in big cities have a seventy-
five mile radius to their exclusive territory, some have an entire state 
or even two states, including Real Salt Lake, which has both Utah 
and Arizona entirely within its territory.111 Moreover, some territories 
are overlapping, such as when the teams occupy the same city so that 
the two teams’ youth academies compete for the players within their 
shared territory.112 In cases where there is no MLS team and no estab-
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lished territory, a team may set up an affiliate relationship and pre-
sumably claim Homegrown status for the players it helps to develop.113 
 In addition to providing a team with exclusive access to a player 
developed in their youth Academy, Homegrown players have special 
budget roster rules.114 Previously, up to two Homegrown players were 
exempt from a team’s Salary Budget Charge altogether.115 They were 
treated like Generation Adidas signings. As of December of 2015, all 
teams receive $125,000 of allocation money to use to buy down the 
Salary Budget Charge of one or more Homegrown players on either 
the Supplemental or Reserve Roster to the minimum salary charge for 
each.116 Teams may also use up the $200,000 of Targeted Allocation 
Money to sign new Homegrown players to their first MLS contract.117  
5.   Discovery Process 
 Even if a player is not subject to the Allocation process, the Su-
perDraft, or the Homegrown rule, it is still not a free-for-all among 
MLS teams to sign the player. Instead, their MLS rights are subject 
to what is known as a “Discovery Process.”118 Under this system, if a 
player is not yet under contract to MLS, the team has to place him on 
its “Discovery List” before signing him.119 Although the name sug-
gests the players are little known players unearthed through dedi-
cated scouting, the Discovery Process applies even to Designated 
Player prospects who are well known players in foreign leagues, with 
caveats preventing teams without the intent or financial ability to 
sign a player from adding him to their Discovery Lists for hold-up 
value only.120 At any one time, a team may have seven players on its 
Discovery List, which it can add to or subtract from continuously.121 It 
can sign up to six players off of its Discovery List to its Senior Ros-
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ter.122 The Discovery Lists are kept confidential, and the league does 
not publicly reveal whether a player is subject to a Discovery Claim.123 
 The problem with this Discovery Process, at least until recently, is 
that a team could theoretically claim a player on its Discovery List 
without actually contacting the player, let alone trying to sign them to 
a contract with the league.124 The claim could be nothing more than a 
gambit to secure compensation from an interested team. Although 
there was supposedly a process in place to ensure that a team’s claim 
was legitimate before it could receive compensation, the standards 
were undefined and the whole process was called a “gray-area-laden 
quagmire.”125 One commentator called it an “embarrassment.”126  
 Because of concerns about disputed claims and locked out play-
ers under the Discovery Process, it was amended in 2015 to outline 
a standard dispute resolution procedure.127 The rules continue a 
first-in-time rule, but offer a relief process and a set amount of 
compensation if another team seeks to acquire the player’s rights.128 
If a team wants to sign a player who is then on another team’s Dis-
covery List, it can offer $50,000 in Allocation Money, and the other 
team must either accept the offer or “make the player a genuine, 
objectively reasonable offer.”129  
 Even after the new rules were put in place, there were accusations 
that teams were still using Discovery Claims to effectively hold play-
ers hostage for the $50,000 in Allocation Money or to block their sign-
ing by another team, rather than because they were genuinely inter-
ested in signing the players.130 In one well-publicized example, Bruce 
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Arena called the New England Revolution’s Discovery Claim on Se-
bastian Lletget to the LA Galaxy to be “a blackmail job” considering 
that Lletget actually trained with the Galaxy during their preseason 
trip to Ireland and had no apparent contact from the Revolution at 
the same time.131 In his case, though, the problem was that the Gal-
axy had filed a Discovery Claim on March 1, which was before the 
new collective bargaining agreement and the new Discovery Process 
had been ratified, and once that occurred the Discovery Claims reset, 
leading the Revolution to jump in line ahead of the Galaxy.132 A more 
blatant example of a strategic discovery claim was one placed on 
Zlatan Ibrahimović by the Philadelphia Union, whose coach admitted 
that it was done with an eye toward receiving the $50,000 compensa-
tion rather than actually signing the player.133 Major League Soccer 
reportedly invalidated the Union’s claim because it apparently deemed 
it unlikely that the Union was going to make a “genuine, objectively 
reasonable offer,” which only increased criticism of MLS for its lack of 
transparency and communication in arriving at that conclusion.134 
 Even when the team with the discovery rights is genuinely inter-
ested in signing a player, problems can arise. A notable example is 
the dispute between DC United and Orlando City over the signing of 
Italian star Antonio Nocerino. DC United owned the rights to sign 
Nocerino by virtue of having “discovered” him, but Nocerino ultimate-
ly preferred to join his former AC Milan teammate Kaka in Orlan-
do.135 After much wrangling and saber-rattling about tampering, Or-
lando ended up acquiring Nocerino’s rights from DC United for an 
amount of Targeted Allocation Money and Allocation Money that 
presumably exceeded the required $50,000 under the rules.136 
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 One additional feature of the new Discovery Process is that one 
player on a team’s roster may be classified as a “Special Discovery 
Player.”137 This allows a team to amortize the cost of its transfer fee 
over the length of the player’s contract. Otherwise, the player’s trans-
fer fee would have to be accounted for in the year of acquisition, 
which could push the total cost beyond the maximum Salary Budget 
Charge for the player.138 
 Even if a non-MLS player is on a team’s Discovery List and the 
player is willing to enter into a contract with MLS on terms accepta-
ble to the league and the team, the player may only be transferred 
from a club in another league to MLS during one of the two transfer 
windows.139 In 2017, the Primary Transfer Window took place from 
February 14 until May 8, and the Secondary Transfer Window took 
place from July 10 until August 9.140 Unlike trade deadlines in other 
American sports leagues, though, the transfer windows may not align 
with the seasons of the transfer target’s team, making a deal harder 
to reach. Thus, even if MLS decides that it wants to acquire a player 
from a club in England’s Premier League in mid-February, for exam-
ple, which meets the inbound deadline for the Primary Transfer 
Window, the player’s club may resist because it would be in-season. 
Moreover, even if the club had been willing to transfer the player in-
season, the MLS window may come too late. In the English Premier 
League, for example, the 2017 winter Transfer Window was from 
January 1 to January 31.141 
C.   Player Acquisitions—Internal 
1.   Trades 
 Intra-league trades of players are permitted in MLS at any time 
during the offseason and during the Primary and Secondary Transfer 
Windows in-season.142 Since players are contracted to MLS rather to 
an individual team, “no trade” clauses, which are common in some 
other American sports leagues, generally do not exist in MLS, except 
for Designated Players. Such a free trade environment, which per-
mits trades of players not only for other players, but also for Super-
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Draft picks, Allocation Money, Targeted Allocation Money, Allocation 
Rankings, and International Player Spots,143 is a foreign concept for 
players from other countries where transfers are common but only 
with the consent of the transferred player.144 When Alain Rochat was 
traded from the Vancouver Whitecaps to D.C. United in 2013, he 
called the system “terrible” and inhuman.145 
2.   Free Agency 
 In the Collective Bargaining Agreement the parties adopted in 
2015, MLS granted for the first time a limited form of free agency to 
the players.146 It was far short of what the players sought, but it was 
more than what they had, which was a system where a team held 
their MLS rights even after their contract expired.147 Under this new 
hybrid form of free agency, out-of-contract players who are at least 
twenty-eight years of age and have been in the league for at least 
eight years are eligible to choose their next MLS team.148 This does 
not mean that those players can simply let the market set their price, 
though, at least if the market is defined exclusively as other MLS 
teams.149 Under the terms of the CBA, the maximum amount an MLS 
team can offer is limited to a set percentage depending upon the 
amount of their prior contract.150 For players who made $100,000 or 
less the prior year, the maximum raise they can be offered is twenty-
five percent.151 For players who made between $100,000 and 
$200,000 the prior year, they can negotiate a raise of up to twenty 
percent.152 Finally, for players who made $200,000 or more the previ-
ous year, the maximum raise they can receive is fifteen percent.153 
Notwithstanding the precision of such caps, the agreement apparent-
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ly also provides for an increase in the percentage raises “for players 
who significantly outperform their contracts.”154  
 The free agency process is too new to be able to make any judg-
ments about how it is being utilized. Only a relatively small number 
of players qualified under the age and time of service requirements, 
which limits its value to the players. Nevertheless, a few players 
have signed with other MLS teams, and those players did get to 
freely “select” among interested teams,155 which is one of the features 
of a free agency process. Only one player who moved teams received 
even the modest capped raise to his compensation that was contem-
plated under the CBA.156 For some of the veteran players generally 
perceived to be on the downside of their careers who moved, it would 
not be surprising to find out that they took a pay cut rather than a 
pay raise of any amount. In that sense, this was a far cry from the 
free agency of other American sports. 
3.   Re-Entry Draft 
 The Re-Entry Draft is effectively the old version of free agency 
that was put in place under the prior Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment.157 Although much less attractive than the current free agency 
process, it is still in place for certain younger players who have not 
attained the age or years of MLS service to be eligible for free agen-
cy.158 Players have to be either: (1) at least twenty-three years of age 
and have a minimum of three years of experience in MLS to be eligi-
ble if their current MLS team does not want to exercise their contract 
options, or (2) at least twenty-five years of age and have a minimum 
of four years of experience in MLS if their current MLS team does not 
want to resign them at an amount at least equal to their 2015 sala-
ry.159 There are two stages to the Re-Entry Draft. In Stage One, 
                                                                                                                                       
 154. Press Release, Major League Soccer Players Union, supra note 150. 
 155. See, e.g., ESPN Staff, Sporting KC Makes Justin Mapp First Free-Agent Signing 
in MLS History, ESPN FC (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.espnfc.us/major-league-soccer/ 
story/2756300/sporting-kc-make-justin-mapp-first-free-agent-signing-in-mls [https://perma.cc/ 
NKT4-UUTN].  
 156. Jeff Carlisle, MLS’ Free Agency Process Has Proved Beneficial for the Players 
Involved, ESPN FC (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.espnfc.com/major-league-soccer/ 
19/blog/post/2810678/mls-free-agency-meets-mixed-response-from-players-and-teams 
[https://perma.cc/YKX7-PA8Q] (referencing Justin Mapp, who moved from Montreal to 
Sporting KC, as an example).  
 157. MLS Players Union Announces That It Has Ratified Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, MLS SOCCER (July 16, 2015, 5:17 PM), http://www.mlssoccer.com/post/ 
2015/07/16/mls-players-union-announces-it-has-ratified-collective-bargaining-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/SJ4S-Q6GC].  
 158. 2017 MLS Roster Rules and Regulations, supra note 2 (“Player Acquisition Mech-
anisms – Re-Entry Process”). 
 159. Id.; MLS Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 44, §§ 29.1, 29.3, at 77-78. 
414  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:385 
  
teams selecting a player agree to exercise their options or sign them 
to an amount equal to their last annual base salary.160 If a player is 
not selected in Stage One, he may be selected in Stage Two, which is 
when the selecting team may negotiate a new salary with the play-
er.161 Because of the increased flexibility to negotiate more favorable 
financial terms in Stage Two, few players are ever selected in Stage 
One. In the 2015 Re-Entry Draft, only two players were selected  
in Stage One, and in 2016, only three players were selected in  
Stage One.162 
4.   Waiver, Expansion, and Dispersal Drafts 
 There are a variety of drafts occasionally held to reallocate players 
within MLS. These only occur when circumstances warrant. The 
most frequent of these is the Waiver Draft.163 Much like in other 
American sports leagues, if a player is placed on waivers during the 
regular season, he is made available to all other teams on the same 
contractual terms to which he was signed for his existing team.164 
The teams select in reverse order of their points per game after the 
first three games of the season, with any team selecting a player 
moving to the bottom of the list.165 If a player becomes available in 
the Waiver Draft before all teams have completed at least three 
games, then they select in reverse order of last season’s finish.166 One 
unique aspect of the Waiver Draft in MLS is that it applies not only 
to players waived by a current MLS team who are not eligible for the 
Re-Entry Draft or Free Agency, but also to former college players not 
selected in the SuperDraft or who did not make the team that select-
ed him, as well as to players returning to MLS when the team, hav-
ing the right of first refusal, chose not to exercise it.167 Effectively, the 
Waiver Draft is utilized as a mechanism to avoid open bidding in 
these circumstances. As a practical matter, though, players made 
available in the Waiver Draft are often not in great demand by other 
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teams. In the most recent Waiver Draft held in December 2015, only 
one of the thirty players made available was drafted.168 
 The next most common of the occasional drafts is the Expansion 
Draft, but it may be short-lived. In the round of expansion in 2014, 
Orlando City SC and New York City FC both began operations in 
MLS with an Expansion Draft.169 Under the rules in effect for those 
drafts, teams were entitled to protect eleven players.170 Generation 
Adidas and Homegrown players were automatically protected against 
selection, but Designated Players only had to be protected if they had 
a no-trade clause in their contracts.171 If a player was selected, his 
current team was entitled to move one more player to its protected 
list and no team could lose more than two players.172 Neither Orlando 
City SC nor NYC FC, however, truly built the core of its roster based 
on the Expansion Draft, leading to reports that the league was con-
sidering scrapping the Expansion Draft entirely when new expansion 
teams—Atlanta United FC, Minnesota United FC, and Los Angeles 
FC—entered the league in either 2017 or 2018.173 The alternative 
was to give expansion teams more allocation money and internation-
al slots. Some suggested that this would hamper teams’ ability to 
create a competitive roster beyond their three DPs,174 but theoretical-
ly, it would allow them to choose whether they want to trade those 
assets to acquire MLS veterans or use them to participate in the 
global marketplace for talent. Nevertheless, at the end of the 2016 
season, MLS elected to keep the Expansion Draft, albeit in modified 
form with Atlanta and Minnesota only selecting five players each, 
rather than the ten selected by Orlando and New York.175 
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 The final internal mechanism for reallocating players within MLS 
is the Dispersal Draft. This is necessary if a team ends operation, 
which has occurred several times in the history of the league.176 Alt-
hough MLS would like to think such drafts are a thing of the past, it 
was used as recently as 2014 when Chivas USA ceased operations.177 
In some respects, the Dispersal Draft is unique within MLS in that 
the players are all contracted to MLS.178 This means that it is effec-
tively a mechanism by which MLS can decide whether it is worth re-
taining those players and / or exercising their player contracts for the 
following year without permitting open bidding. In that sense, it is 
really a variant on the Waiver Draft. 
5.   Emergency Replacements 
 Although MLS rosters are capped at thirty players, there are oc-
casions where the rules permit a team to add to its roster because of 
unforeseen circumstances. The first is what is called an “Extreme 
Hardship Call-Up.”179 This is permitted in one of two circumstances. 
The most common occurs if a team with three goalkeepers on its ros-
ter is down to only one healthy goalkeeper for a particular game.180 In 
these circumstances, the league maintains a “pool goalkeeper” who 
can be assigned to a team on a short-term basis.181 Although all MLS 
players are contracted to the league rather than an individual team, 
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pool goalkeepers are players who are contracted to the league with-
out actually being assigned to any individual team.182 They train with 
teams in their area, waiting for a call-up.183 The second circumstance 
in which an Extreme Hardship Call-Up is permitted is when a team 
has fewer than four available outfield substitutes, or, in other words, 
when it has fewer than fourteen outfield players available.184 This 
seems particularly unlikely, especially with rosters as large as thirty 
and most teams having an affiliate with a USL team where a short-
term loan can be arranged for up to four days for outside competitions, 
although utilizing a USL short-term loan for MLS players means that 
the team must follow the Extreme Hardship Call-Up process.185 
 A second unforeseen circumstance in which a roster move is per-
mitted is in the event of injuries. Although injuries are also likely to 
be the most common reason for an Extreme Hardship Call-Up, the 
rules do not actually require that the need for that kind of signing 
arise because of an injury. Those unforeseen circumstances could in-
clude absences for personal circumstances, such as the birth of a 
child or the death of a family member. Losing the services of a player 
because of an injury is covered by two separate provisions depending 
upon the severity of the injury. For a player lost to an injury for the 
remainder of the season, the team can sign a player as a “Season-
Ending Injury Replacement.”186 For a player lost to an injury for a 
shorter period (they must sit out a minimum of six games), a team 
can sign what is called a “Short-Term Injury Replacement.”187 In ei-
ther case, the injured player cannot be placed in the designated cate-
gory until a replacement is signed, and the team remains responsible 
for the Salary Budget Charge of the injured player as well as for the 
replacement.188 Similarly, the team remains subject to the limits on 
International Player Slots, although an International Player may 
replace an injured International Player.189   
D.   Non-MLS Rules 
 Adding another layer to the complexity, MLS is not the only source 
of rules governing the operation of the teams in its league. Since MLS 
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is a sanctioned league under the U.S. Soccer Federation (“USSF”) and 
the Canadian Soccer Association (“CSA”), and both the USSF and the 
CSA are authorized by FIFA to serve as the sanctioning bodies for 
leagues operating in their respective jurisdictions, MLS is indirectly 
required to comply with FIFA rules.190 This includes the rules govern-
ing the game itself—called the “Laws of the Game”—which are the 
province of an organization based in Switzerland called the Interna-
tional Football Association Board (“IFAB”).191 Comprised of FIFA, the 
English Football Association, the Scottish Football Association, the 
Football Association of Wales, and the Irish Football Association 
(Northern Ireland), the IFAB is the keeper of the rules, so-to-speak.192 
It was created in 1886 in England to regulate the growing sport and to 
standardize the rules for its play.193 FIFA was added to the IFAB, 
without removing any of the legacy British football associations, in the 
early twentieth century as the sport spread globally.194 The current 
version of the Laws and its Interpretations, which operate like regula-
tions that amplify the rules, is 139 pages, and a major reform project 
was undertaken recently to amend and simplify those rules.195 
 In recent years, MLS has complied with these Laws of the Game, 
but that was not always the case. In the early years of operation, 
MLS had kick-ins rather than throw-ins, corner kicks from the edge 
of the box rather than the corner of the field, and ties were broken 
with shootouts involving a player starting at the thirty-five-yard line 
and having five seconds to score past the goalkeeper.196 How did MLS 
get away with such clear deviations from the Laws set forth by the 
IFAB? As Francisco Marcos, the founder and first president of cur-
rent third division league USL explained when asked about his 
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league’s own deviation from the Laws of the Game to permit five sub-
stitutions, rather than three, due to the demands of playing two 
games in a weekend with a small roster, “FIFA looked the other way. 
FIFA will look the other way whenever it is convenient to look the 
other way.”197 In other words, MLS is subject to FIFA rules in design-
ing the game, but enforcement is a matter of FIFA’s discretion, creat-
ing additional uncertainty to an already complex system. 
 Off the field, MLS is also subject to FIFA regulations on the trans-
fer of players.198 For example, the CBA agreement with the Players 
Union provides that except as specifically provided otherwise, “MLS 
shall comply with FIFA regulations regarding the player’s interna-
tional registration and playing rights.”199 MLS also agrees that “any 
loan, transfer, assignment or sale of MLS’s rights to the Player’s ser-
vices, whether prior to or after the termination of the Player’s 
[Standard Player Agreement], shall only be made in accordance with 
all applicable rules and regulations of FIFA and any relevant govern-
ing body” so long as the rules don’t conflict with state or federal law 
or any other provisions of the CBA.200 In part, this requires that the 
league obtain an International Transfer Certificate from the Football 
Association where the player formerly played and provide one when a 
player’s contract terminates and he desires to play elsewhere.201 
III.   COMPLEXITY THEORY 
 The web of rules that govern the acquisition of players in MLS 
certainly seems complex to the average observer, but many rules 
seem complex to the uninitiated even though they are considered 
fairly simple by seasoned practitioners. Moreover, despite the general 
bias in favor of simplicity, complexity is sometimes accepted as a 
“necessary evil.”202 We therefore need to have a more robust under-
standing of the theory of complexity and its uses and abuses before 
classifying MLS’ system of roster rules as complex, and before con-
demning it for being so. 
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A.   Defining Complexity 
 Some people use the word “complex” to describe a particular rule 
or provision when they really just mean that it is complicated.203 In 
this sense, complexity can merely be a function of linguistic indeter-
minacy. At its most basic level, it is difficult to describe a require-
ment in a way that is both precise and simple. This can be because of 
the incompetence or sloth of the drafter, or it can be because of the 
failings of the English language. Just as an interpreter sometimes 
has difficulty translating a concept because of the lack of a word in 
English that is comparable to the word used in the passage submit-
ted for translation,204 so too do drafters struggle in vain for words 
that could explain in simple terms the more complicated and nuanced 
intent behind a particular provision. 
 Complexity can also be defined in more objective terms. For ex-
ample, a document or set of rules is often characterized as complex 
merely because of its length or the number of provisions or sections it 
contains.205 This is often seen as per se evidence of the Internal Rev-
enue Code’s complexity, with critics pointing to its length and virtu-
ally nothing else to justify their characterization.206 In the contractu-
al realm, complexity is sometimes measured by counting the number 
of particularly complicated provisions, such as “elaborate clauses,” 
which address things like control, incentives, and price; “enforcement 
provisions,” which include confidentiality, arbitration, and choice of 
law provisions; and “coordination provisions,” which include notifica-
tion and auditing rights.207 More generally, “[c]omplex contracts in-
clude details like roles and responsibilities to be performed or specific 
procedures for monitoring, consequences of non-compliance, and de-
scription of expected outcomes or output.”208 
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 Peter Schuck offers a broader definition of complexity than mere 
complicatedness or lengthiness. He defined a system as complex when 
it is dense, technical, institutionally differentiated, and indeterminate 
or uncertain.209 Under this definition, rules or contractual provisions 
are dense when they are “numerous and encompassing.”210 They seek 
to “occupy a large portion of the relevant policy space and seek to con-
trol a broad range of conduct.”211 A dense system of rules would be con-
sidered technical when the rules “require special sophistication or ex-
pertise on the part of those who wish to understand and apply them,” 
which generally means employing “specialized terminology.”212 Pension 
law and tax law are often cited as examples of dense, technical sys-
tems of rules that are made even more complicated by the fact that 
they attempt to “regulate a myriad of issues” between individuals, em-
ployers or payers, and the government as regulator.213  
 A system is institutionally differentiated when “it is governed by 
statutory provisions, regulatory standards promulgated by several 
different agencies,” and by common law principles applied in litiga-
tion.214 This is what some have referred to as “functional” or “opera-
tional” complexity.215 For example, a rule adopted by a federal admin-
istrative agency may be written quite clearly, but it may conflict with 
other rules. Even if the agency rules provide guidance on resolving 
the conflict, the rule may be subordinate to other provisions such as 
the Constitution, the statutory provision delegating power to the 
agency to adopt the rule, and the agency’s own pronouncements and 
guidance regarding the application of the rule. Moreover, while the 
agency may interpret the rule in choosing to apply it to a particular 
situation, that interpretation may be overruled by the courts or 
courts in different jurisdictions may accord the interpretation of the 
agency differing levels of deference.216  
 Finally, a system of rules may be complex not so much because it 
is detailed and full of exceptions, but rather the opposite. It may be 
complex because it is underspecified, such as when the rules, and the 
system itself, are “open-textured, flexible, multi-factored, and flu-
id.”217 For example, a common law system of rules, governed by prec-
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edent as well as by individual judges, may provide some guidance to 
participants, but nothing approaching certainty even in the face of 
precedent because of both the ability to distinguish precedent and the 
ability to overturn it. This helps to explain why a tax lawyer’s legal 
opinion, which is often sought out to guard against the imposition of 
penalties against taking unreasonable reporting positions, is often 
carefully couched in probabilistic terms even if the lawyer authoring 
the opinion has extensive training in the law and is fully informed as 
to all relevant precedents.218 Alternatively, this lack of specification 
may be deliberate and enshrined in the statutes themselves. Exam-
ples include a reasonableness requirement in tort law or a general 
anti-abuse provision in tax law.219  
 These are not the only characteristics one might use to describe a 
complex system,220 but they are the types of characteristics one nor-
mally associates with a complex system. Moreover, not all the char-
acteristics need be present at all or to the same degree in order to 
establish complexity. Rather, most rules or systems of rules fall onto 
a continuum that measures the degree of complexity that may be 
present.221 The greater the number of characteristics present, and the 
greater their strength, the more it shifts toward complexity and away 
from simplicity.222  
B.   Rationales for Complexity 
 Only the most dedicated wordsmith would profess any love for a 
complex rule or system of rules. Most seek simplification. What, then, 
is the justification for complexity? The answer differs depending upon 
whether it is found in legal and administrative rules or whether it is 
found in contractual provisions or organizational processes.223  
 In the context of legal rules, complexity is considered problematic 
because it raises the costs both for those tasked with complying with 
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the rules as well as those in charge of enforcing them.224 For those 
subject to the rules, a lack of clarity can impose a variety of costs. 
First, there are costs incurred to understand and comply with the 
rule.225 If the rule is difficult to understand or the various overlap-
ping systems of rules are difficult to navigate, then the person seek-
ing to comply may have to hire a specialist to advise them as to 
whether their proposed course of action is permitted. Those who 
choose not to do so or who cannot afford to do so may unwittingly fail 
to comply, incurring both the costs associated with wasted activity 
and with the unwinding of completed transactions.  
 Second, where the complexity of a rule is a function of its indeter-
minacy, compliance may require foregoing productive activity, which 
imposes costs in the form of lost profits or the loss of whatever value 
was anticipated from the activity. This can occur because the uncer-
tainty of the rule, which may be designed to allow it to be more flexi-
bly applied, necessitating that a wide berth be given to activities that 
could plausibly appear to be governed by the rule. If a business re-
frains from engaging in otherwise permissible activity, it not only 
imposes costs on the business itself from the loss of revenue, but to 
society as a whole from the chilling of productive activity.  
 Finally, there may be costs associated with potential litigation re-
lated to compliance with the rule. Obviously, if a complex rule is not 
observed to the letter of the law and litigation or an enforcement ac-
tion ensues, the resulting costs can be great both in terms of attor-
ney’s fees and in terms of lost productivity. In a multi-layered com-
plex system, the costs may be multiplied as the parties have to weave 
their way through various levels and different jurisdictions. Even in 
the absence of actual litigation, however, a business may have to tie 
up large amounts of capital in the form of reserves against the poten-
tial threat of litigation when questionable activity is undertaken.  
 Complexity may be no less costly for those who are charged with 
enforcing the rules. If the rules are indeterminate and therefore flex-
ible, they may be more plausibly deployed in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances, but it may be more difficult to persuade courts that they 
should be permitted in a specific circumstance. If, by contrast, the 
rules are drafted in a detailed and precise fashion, it may be easy to 
apply them to the circumstances specifically contemplated by the 
rules, but it also may be easier for businesses to avoid them by ex-
ploiting the gaps that lie between the rules. Furthermore, if the com-
plexity is a function of the multiple, overlapping and interlocking 
systems, the enforcement costs may be duplicated as a result of un-
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certain jurisdictional boundaries and inconsistent positions taken by 
decision-makers at the various stages of review.  
 Given these costs, why is legal complexity tolerated in many in-
stances? A common rationale offered in defense of complexity is that 
it ensures a fairer application of the rules.226 A bright-line rule is 
simpler to apply than a rule that is riddled with exceptions, but those 
exceptions may reflect the fact that there are real differences that 
demand different treatment as a matter of equity. Therefore, in order 
to ensure similarly situated people are treated the same (sometimes 
called “horizontal equity”), an exception must be created to avoid sub-
jecting one group, but not another, to a rule.227 
 Under this fairness rationale, complexity may be necessary not 
merely because it ensures that only the proper parties are subject to 
the rules, but rather because it provides adequate information to the 
regulated parties. Vague rules may give insufficient notice to the in-
tended targets that they are subject to the rules and insufficient in-
formation as to how to comply with them. Moreover, a system of rules 
may be complex in the sense of having multiple layers of appeals in 
order to ensure that the rules are fairly applied and that the offend-
ing party has indeed violated the rules. A simpler system might avoid 
that complexity, but at the price of potentially subjecting innocent 
parties to liability. 
 Another justification for legal complexity is that it produces a 
more efficient result in the sense that more precise rules help to dif-
ferentiate socially productive activity from socially unproductive ac-
tivity. 228 This better allocates resources to their highest and most 
productive use, at least to the extent that the benefits of those uses 
outweigh the costs associated with interpreting and complying with 
                                                                                                                                       
 226. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 16, at 6 (“Complexity is sometimes justified on the 
grounds that simplification will reduce fairness.”); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax 
Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve? 76 N.C. L. REV. 
151, 155 (1997) (“Complexity is a by-product of a tax regime’s reconciliation of the lofty 
aspiration to distribute tax burdens equitably and the mundane requirement that the tax 
be susceptible to administration and compliance.”). For further discussion of the interplay 
of complexity and equity, see McCaffery, supra note 220, at 1279-91.  
 227. Although complexity is usually attributed to a desire to create a set of rules that 
treats different individuals and groups fairly, it is also possible to explain complexity as a 
means to favor one individual or group. For example, an exception written into a statute at 
the behest of a wealthy campaign donor may increase the complexity of the statutory 
scheme at the price of, rather than in advance of, fairness. The so-called “rifle-shot” 
provision is an example of a specially targeted provision to benefit one individual or entity 
that makes the law more complex, while arguably reducing its fairness. See, e.g., Lawrence 
Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation 
Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563 (1989) (discussing the unequal treatment, while 
concluding that an equal protection challenge would likely fail). 
 228. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262 (1974); Kaplow, supra note 16, at 161. 




the rules.229 Even an under-specification of the rules may be efficient, 
to the extent that it also provides a degree of discretion or flexibility 
in applying the rules in a way that maximizes the achievement of a 
system’s goals.230 In both cases, however, when the costs associated 
with understanding, complying with, and enforcing those rules grow 
too high, the net benefits could weigh in favor of simplicity.231 
C.   Contractual Complexity 
 Although rules imposed as part of a contractual relationship are 
superficially similar to the rules imposed by government regulators, 
they must be evaluated under different standards. Many of the objec-
tions to rules imposed by statutes and administrative regulations 
simply do not apply in a cooperative venture where the parties have 
consensually agreed to be bound by the rules via contract.  
 One reason to draft complex rules in a cooperative venture is to 
ensure partners or participants remain aligned in the pursuit of a 
common goal.232 As UCLA Professor William Ouchi explained, “the 
fundamental problem of cooperation stems from the fact that indi-
viduals have only partially overlapping goals. Left to their own devic-
es, they pursue incongruent objectives and their efforts are uncoordi-
nated. Any collectivity which has an economic goal must then find a 
means to control diverse individuals efficiently.”233 Complex contrac-
tual rules are a way to reinforce “goal congruence” where it does not 
otherwise naturally exist.234 
 A subset of the issue of goal alignment is the problem of partner 
opportunism or hold-up. Harvard Economist Oliver Williamson has 
described opportunism as “a variety of self-interest seeking . . . [that] 
extends simple self-interest seeking to include self-interest seeking 
with guile.”235 The risk of opportunistic behavior often arises where 
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contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot provide for all 
contingencies or account for unforeseeable changes in circumstanc-
es.236 When these events occur and the parties seek to adapt, part-
ners acting opportunistically can try to hold-up the contract by refus-
ing to cooperate until their new demands are met.237 They effectively 
try to renege on their obligations and negotiate for higher benefits.238 
 This partner opportunism can occur for a variety of reasons. One 
of the most cited explanations is the presence of transaction-specific 
investment.239 If the investment is liquid and easily re-deployed, then 
uncooperative partners can simply take their marbles and go home 
without much resistance by the remaining partners if they are un-
happy with the direction of the venture. If the venture has invested 
in specific assets, however, that would lose a percentage of their val-
ue when taken out of the venture; a partner can hold-up the other 
partners by threatening to withdraw and force the break-up of those 
firm specific assets.240  
 A second explanation for partner opportunism is the high costs 
associated with finding a replacement partner.241 If partners are fun-
gible, then a partner’s threat to withdraw can be empty, reducing its 
ability to hold-up the other partners. If, however, the cost of search-
ing for a new partner is high, then there is a premium placed on the 
importance of keeping the partner tied into the venture. This can ex-
acerbate the risk of partners opportunistically taking advantage of 
this leverage to hold-up the venture. 
 As the risk of partner opportunism rises, so too does the need for 
complex “contractual safeguards.”242 These safeguards, however, are 
costly to negotiate, monitor, and enforce, making them inefficient 
when the partners are relatively aligned in their objectives.243 If 
those costs exceed the risks of opportunism and hold-up, then a rela-
tively simple contract can be employed. 
 In long-term relationships, repeated contracting increases the risk 
of partnership hold-up because of the continual opportunity to rene-
gotiate contractual safeguards. Long-term contracts, however, are 
difficult to draft because of the uncertainty about the future and the 
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need for adaptation.244 Complexity only increases under those cir-
cumstances because the parties need to provide for a wider variety of 
contingencies than in short-term arrangements. In the context of a 
venture where evolving circumstances are likely, that often leads 
parties to seek a more permanent, yet flexible, means of safeguarding 
their investment.245  
 An equity governance structure such as a corporation, partner-
ship, or limited liability company is one alternative to long-term con-
tracting. This permits adaptation because decisions are made 
through the governance mechanism of the organization, rather than 
as a subject of individual contracts.246 One advantage is that it allows 
disputes to be worked out internally in private rather than with the 
“full contractual specification” necessary in a non-equity venture.247 It 
also avoids the hold-up problem that might plague repeated use of 
short-term contracts as a means of adapting to new circumstances.248  
 From an organizational control theory perspective, such an equity 
governance structure then becomes bureaucratic, involving complex 
rules, when goal incongruence is present, the risk of partnership op-
portunism is high, and it is important to remain flexible and adapta-
ble in the face of changing circumstances. As Jochen Schweitzer  
has written:  
A bureaucratic culture emerges when the parties to a partner-
ship seek to eliminate the potential for opportunistic behavior by 
quantifying and monitoring joint activities and mutual perfor-
mance. Hence, within bureaucracies, partners assume that the 
majority of contingencies can be dealt with by policies, standard-
ized procedures, formal division of responsibility, and hierar-
chical structures which are typically established within the con-
tractual agreement for the partnership.249 
This kind of a formal structure may be particularly necessary during 
periods of growth where a long-term venture is bringing in new in-
vestors and the cultural preconditions for goal congruence are weak. 
 If, by contrast, the risk of opportunism is low and/or the transac-
tion is unlikely to recur, then a formal governance structure with 
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complex rules and policies may be inefficient. It risks being too cum-
bersome, unnecessarily slowing down decisions.250 The tradeoff, 
therefore, is between controlling partners and ensuring flexibility,  
on the one hand, and excessive governance and inefficiency on the  
other hand. 
IV.   COMPLEXITY AS A DESIGN FEATURE IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 
 As Part II illustrated, MLS’ Roster Rules are complex under vir-
tually any definition of the word. They are numerous and seek to be 
all-encompassing. They are full of the unique terminology that often 
requires special expertise, such as “Allocation Money,” “Designated 
Players,” and “Re-Entry Drafts,” which may explain why so many 
foreign coaches and front office personnel have such difficulty adjust-
ing to them.251 They are also subject to the overlay of FIFA rules and 
regulations, which only increases their complexity. Finally, and most 
significantly for many critics, they are non-transparent and constant-
ly changing in a way that appears to outside observers to be designed 
to favor one team over another. The remaining question, however, is 
whether the complexity of the system is problematic.  
A.   What Kind of Complexity? 
 Whether Major League Soccer’s Roster Rules and Regulations are 
unnecessarily complex may depend upon whether they are properly 
evaluated under the standards for legal complexity or contractual 
complexity. The benefits of complexity in each context are different. 
Whereas legal complexity is concerned with guarding against unfair-
ness, contractual complexity is concerned with guarding against goal 
incongruence and partner opportunism. Moreover, the costs associat-
ed with legal and contractual complexity are different. Legal com-
plexity potentially makes it costly for people governed by the rules to 
interpret and comply with them, while contractual complexity poten-
tially makes it too costly for the parties to undertake a venture in the 
first place. 
 In one sense, the answer is that neither standard squarely applies 
to MLS. The Roster Rules and Regulations, despite looking like legal 
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rules, are not actually rules imposed by an external body upon the 
participants. The investor-operators each consent to be governed by 
them by virtue of their participation in the league. At the same time, 
they are not the product of contractual negotiation either. Major 
League Soccer’s limited liability company agreement is a contract, 
but despite the fact that each investor-operator has a seat on the en-
tity’s Board of Governors, the rules themselves are not the same as 
contractual provisions that are individually negotiated ex ante as 
part of a bargaining process.  
 Although neither is an exact fit, the contractual model better de-
scribes the creation and existence of the roster rules and regulations 
used by MLS. Each of the investor-operators agrees to the governance 
structure when it executes the contract that constitutes the limited 
liability company agreement. That includes participating in the crea-
tion of the rules in their roles as members of the management commit-
tee and agreeing to the process by which the rules are created.  
 Indeed, even apart from the limited liability company agreement, 
the relationship between MLS and the investor-operators is entirely 
contractual. According to the information disclosed to the court in the 
Fraser case, MLS contracts with each of the investor-operators to op-
erate one of the league’s teams.252 Under the contract, each investor-
operator has the “exclusive right and obligation to provide Manage-
ment Services for a Team within its Home Territory.”253 These 
agreements provide that the investor-operators “may trade players 
with other MLS teams and select players in the league’s draft. Such 
transactions, however, must follow strict rules established by the 
league. Most importantly, no team may exceed the maximum player 
budget established by the management committee.”254 Thus, the in-
vestor-operators are also subject to the MLS Roster Rules and Regu-
lations by virtue of their contractual agreement to submit to such 
rules as a condition to operating a team. In this sense, the MLS sys-
tem is a hybrid contractual arrangement that in some respects relies 
upon an equity governance model and in some respects relies upon 
long-term contracting to allocate the responsibility for managing an 
individual team. 
 It is true that the MLS Roster Rules and Regulations operate like 
legal rules once they are adopted. Nevertheless, this is no different 
from contractual provisions and commitments, which are binding up-
on the parties once executed. Moreover, unlike legal and administra-
tive rules, the parties subject to the MLS roster rules and regula-
tions—each of its investor-operators—have a say in whether those 
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rules or adopted or amended. If an investor-operator is unhappy with 
a rule and cannot convince its partners to change the rule, it can ex-
ercise its ability to withdraw from the LLC altogether by moving to 
another league or by transferring its interest in the operating agree-
ment to another party, subject to the transfer restrictions contained 
in the agreement.255 
 Because of the contractual nature of the MLS Roster Rules, apply-
ing the standards for evaluating legal complexity would be awkward 
at best. Many of the typical complaints about legal complexity, such 
as the costs associated with uncertainty, hiring experts to interpret 
the rules, and hiring lawyers to litigate them, are less relevant in a 
small group cooperative venture like MLS. For example, even if the 
rules are difficult to understand, the league’s office can easily in-
struct investor-operators on them and it can provide authoritative 
interpretations in individual cases. Moreover, since it must approve 
all transactions centrally,256 the expense of enforcing the rules is al-
ready internalized into the investor-operators’ cost-benefit analysis 
on their investments. Although a costly dispute could theoretically 
arise as a result of an interpretation that an investor-operator found 
questionable, the parties would be contractually bound to abide by 
the dispute resolution mechanism agreed to in the limited liability 
company agreement. This would not eliminate the possibility of cost-
ly litigation but would likely reduce it.  
B.   The Justification for Contractual Complexity in MLS 
 Applying the standards used for evaluating contractual complexi-
ty, it is apparent that the MLS roster rules and regulations are not 
complex by accident, but rather by design. There are two features of 
MLS that dictate a certain amount of complexity. First, the league 
was created and arguably still serves to address the potential risk of 
partner incongruence, which is a growing issue as the investor base 
further grows and diversifies. Complex provisions help to ensure dis-
cipline in light of this partner incongruence. Second, MLS is a long-
term venture and it faces significant uncertainty because of the con-
stantly changing circumstances for professional soccer in the United 
States and globally. An organizational structure that facilitates quick 
action and permits a range of options may permit MLS to better 
adapt to these changes and future opportunities. 
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1.   Partner Congruence 
 One of the principal reasons Alan Rothenberg chose to use the 
single-entity limited liability company structure was to guard against 
partner incongruence on the question of player compensation, since 
that led to the destructive pattern of spiraling salaries in the old 
NASL.257 The complex rules relating to player salaries, including the 
Salary Budget and the limit exceptions for going beyond the budget, 
all reflect and reinforce this original commitment to keeping salaries 
at a manageable level so that individual teams cannot attempt to se-
cure a competitive advantage for themselves at the expense of the 
long-term survival of the league. 
 This focus on maintaining partner congruence was evident from 
the outset of MLS. As the owner-operator of the San Jose Clash, 
which later moved to Houston to become the Dynamo, stated in an 
interview at the beginning of the inaugural season, “[w]e’re compet-
ing but not to the point of destroying each other.”258 Rothenberg de-
signed it so that the structure would help to ensure that the individ-
ual investors remained aligned in their respect for this goal: “Rather 
than having independent team owners flaunting their wealth, inves-
tor operators pay for a share in the league. The arrangement should 
prevent disputes over shared revenues or from exploiting salary cap 
loopholes by controlling the acquisition of players.”259 In many re-
spects, this attitude has not changed that much. The overarching 
goal is prosperity for the league, even if it comes at the expense of the 
rules’ simplicity and stability.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that the league is structured and oper-
ated to enhance the combined interests of the investor-operators, 
partner incongruence appears to be a continuing problem. For exam-
ple, there are wide variations in the activity of each investor-operator 
group’s offseason to improve their respective teams. Grant Wahl, a 
senior writer on soccer for Sports Illustrated, annually ranks teams 
according to how ambitious they are in building a team and an organ-
ization.260 As Wahl states in explaining the rationale for his rankings, 
“MLS is certainly an ambitious league, with commissioner Don Gar-
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ber saying he wants it to be one of the world’s top soccer leagues by 
2022. But some MLS clubs are more ambitious than others . . . .”261 
 Wendy Thomas, an attorney and soccer commentator explains the 
“deepening discord among MLS owners:”262 
MLS ownership groups are now segregated into three factions: the 
New Guard (who want to raise the salary cap, splash the cash on 
acquiring big name players, and win championships), the Moder-
ates (who target mid-price DP acquisitions and hope to punch 
above their weight in competing for championships) and the Old 
Guard (those owners who oppose raising the salary cap and prefer 
relying on cheap young talent in lieu of expensive imports). The 
New Guard include Toronto FC, NYCFC, LA Galaxy, Seattle 
Sounders, and Orlando City, the Moderates include clubs like 
Kansas City, the Portland Timbers, and the Houston Dynamo, 
and the Old Guard include clubs like FC Dallas and DC United.263 
According to Thomas, this partner incongruence is likely to worsen as 
new owners come online amid MLS expansion: 
This disconnect among MLS owners between being wildly ambitious 
and deeply pragmatic will only become more pronounced in the fu-
ture. Both Arthur Blank of Atlanta United FC and the LAFC own-
ership group have announced their intentions to be big players in 
MLS. Indeed, LAFC’s owners (a motley crew which includes former 
NBA star Magic Johnson, venture capitalist Henry Nguyen, enter-
tainment executive Peter Guber and lifestyle guru Tony Robbins) 
have all but publicly declared that they plan to make a play for Cris-
tiano Ronaldo in 2018. Further, if David Beckham’s Miami project 
ever gets off the ground, rest assured that Beckham United plans to 
splash the cash to preserve Beckham’s luxe brand.264 
Effectively, the rise in the fee required for investors seeking to oper-
ate new teams has meant that new owners are likely motivated to 
invest by different things than original owners. They also did not live 
through the downtimes of MLS contraction and near-bankruptcy in 
the early 2000s like the original owners. 
 This complex design of the Targeted Allocation Money rule ap-
pears to be designed specifically to counteract the growing incongru-
ence of the owners. If the focus was on enabling teams to acquire a 
few more superstar players, the league could have increased the max-
                                                                                                                                       
 261. Grant Wahl, The 2016 MLS Ambition Rankings, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED  
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2016/03/04/2016-mls-ambition-rankings 
[https://perma.cc/M955-QK8L].  
 262. Wendy Thomas, The Signing of Dos Santos: Is MLS at the Tipping Point?, CORNER 
OF THE GALAXY (July 20, 2015), http://cornerofthegalaxy.com/2015/07/20/the-signing-of-dos-
santos-is-mls-at-the-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/JT9X-ZM9S]. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 




imum number of Designated Players from three to four or more, or it 
could have created a new category of Designated Players for mid-tier 
salaries and not counted it against the maximum limit for Designat-
ed Players generally.265 Both of these alternatives, however, would 
have left it to the discretion of the investor-operators whether they 
wanted to fill those slots, and it would have only further widened the 
gap between teams with owners who wanted to spend and owners 
who did not. Alternatively, it could have simply increased each 
team’s Salary Budget, but that would have risked enabling investor-
operators to simply use the new money to substitute for money out of 
their own pockets that they might have used to acquire a low-cost 
Designated Player. Instead, the Targeted Allocation Money rule is 
structured to prod investor-operators to acquire higher priced tal-
ent.266 By requiring that teams use the TAM provided to them, trade 
it, or lose it, and requiring that they sign a new DP at an equivalent 
salary if they use the TAM to buy-down an existing DP, it is clear 
that the complexity of the rule is designed to force the investor-
operators to act in a way that would further the league’s goals of ac-
quiring new mid-range talent. 
2.   Uncertainty and Changing Circumstances 
 If the complexity of a rule like Targeted Allocation Money ad-
dresses the problem of partner incongruence, the complexity associ-
ated with constantly changing MLS rules addresses the problem of 
long-term contracting amidst uncertainty. One of the main sources of 
this uncertainty is that the league operates in a unique competitive 
environment for acquiring players. The number of viable alternatives 
for individuals looking to play soccer professionally exceeds those in 
virtually any other American team sport.267 Not only is there at least 
one other professional soccer league in the U.S.—the North American 
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Soccer League—that arguably seeks to compete with MLS for play-
ers,268 there is also a global market for soccer players. Most of the 
leagues around the world are much farther along in their develop-
ment than MLS. Although there are some limited foreign markets in 
a few other American sports—such as baseball, basketball, and hock-
ey—the global market for soccer players is vast and the cross-border 
transfer market is robust. Moreover, transfers are not simply the 
province of each individual league. They are regulated by rules 
adopted by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA), the governing body of all football associations, as well as by 
the immigration laws of the individual nations and regional bodies 
such as the European Union. Major League Soccer’s player acquisi-
tion system, therefore, must operate against the backdrop of this 
global market for players. 
 Major League Soccer also operates in a continually changing envi-
ronment from a revenue perspective. Attendance has increased dra-
matically in recent years, with the average per game growing twenty 
percent between 2014 and 2015 from 19,147 to 21,574.269 This was 
seventh globally among soccer leagues, ahead of the first divisions in 
France, the Netherlands, Argentina, and Brazil.270 It also ranks well 
ahead of the average attendance in the NBA and the NHL.271 Televi-
sion revenue has also increased dramatically from the early days 
when the league had to pay to induce networks to carry their games 
to now, when the league is operating under an eight-year contract 
signed in 2015 with ESPN, FOX, and Univision to carry its national 
games for $90 million per year.272 Combined with the expansion fees 
received from the new investor-operators that have entered the 
league in the last few years, it is not surprising that Forbes rated the 
average team’s worth at $157 million, up fifty-two percent over the 
average just two years earlier.273 
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 The changing fiscal and competitive environment necessitates the 
flexibility to change rules on the fly under the current governance 
structure. Sigi Schmid, a long-time coach in MLS who currently is 
the skipper for the Seattle Sounders, captured the essence of the 
league’s approach when he discussed the new TAM provision and the 
Designated Player rules: 
I remember when I first came into the league, (former U.S. nation-
al team coach) Bob Gansler called it, “rule du jour.” . . . But at the 
end of the day, when you really look at it, the league has given 
themselves the flexibility. . . . They don’t have all the rules codified 
like some people would like because it has given them the flexibil-
ity to adjust and make the common sense decisions that are best 
for the league.274 
The single-entity structure thus allows decisions to be made quickly, 
either by the league office itself or by the vote of the investor-
operators. Although this comes at the cost of transparency and pre-
dictability, it offers the advantage of adaptability. 
3.   Is MLS Excessively Complex? 
 In evaluating whether rules are needlessly complex under the 
standard for contractual complexity, the basis is not the cost of inter-
preting and complying with the rule, but whether the complexity 
makes investment in the enterprise unattractive. In the case of MLS, 
if the complexity of the Roster Rules and Regulations were excessive, 
you would expect to see potential investor-operators opting out be-
cause of it or paying less than they might have otherwise. Instead, 
ownership groups are lining up to get a chance to bid for expansion 
teams. According to Commissioner Don Garber, “[t]here is no short-
age of demand for MLS expansion teams,”275 with cities ranging from 
Detroit, Indianapolis, Las Vegas, Sacramento, San Antonio, and St. 
Louis all rumored to be vying for the next round of slots.276 Moreover, 
expansion fees in the last round went over $100 million for the first 
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time ever, indicating that the complexity of MLS’ rules have not 
served to undercut the price.277 It is clear that MLS’ complexity is not 
considered a factor weighing against investment in the league. In-
deed, it may be that investor demand is stoked in part because poten-
tial investors know that MLS’ complexity will ensure that partners 
remain aligned on key issues such as the single-entity structure and 
unrestricted free agency. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Major League Soccer’s Roster Rules and Regulations are complex, 
but that complexity is a design feature rather than a flaw in execu-
tion. Critics of the league’s complexity have judged the rules under 
the standards used to evaluate legal complexity, arguing that the 
costs associated with interpreting and applying the rules outweigh 
any fairness advantages it provides. Major League Soccer, however, 
is better evaluated under a contractual complexity framework. The 
league is a single-entity limited liability company. All of its investor-
operators are members of the LLC and, in their capacity as members 
of the Board of Governors, they participate in the creation and en-
forcement of the rules. Moreover, they all contract with MLS to oper-
ate a team pursuant to the rules devised by the league. As contractual 
rules, they are better understood as responding to the problems of 
partner incongruence and uncertainty in a long-term contracting envi-
ronment. As long as the complexity is not so severe as to chill invest-
ment or to interfere with the ability of the league to compete, then it 
may be justified. This is particularly true since partner incongruence 
has increased with the admission of new investors and uncertainty has 
grown with the changing environment for professional soccer. 
 Although the complex nature of MLS’ Roster Rules and Regula-
tions may be necessary to keep the investor-operators aligned and to 
permit the league to remain adaptable, it could soon become counter-
productive. It may be that greater transparency and simplicity is 
necessary, not so much to protect the teams, but to convince the fans 
that the league is actually a first-class enterprise.278 Indeed, there 
may come a time when, to fully realize its potential as a top league, 
MLS will need to revisit its objectives and move past its insistence on 
cost containment and the pursuit of strategic opportunities. At that 
time, complex rules and the single-entity structure may need to be 
abandoned. For now, however, Major League Soccer is a classic ex-
ample of the use of complexity to achieve organizational success. 
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